Speaking at a coarse level of resolution, I'd say the two primary functions of the rational intellect are to unite disparate cases and to distinguish within particulars. I'd say monism is primarily the articulation of this impulse toward finding a common basis in disparate instances at its greatest degree of generality. One doesn't need to jump through many hoops to assert "there is one universe" in one way or another, and assert that each particular is a localized expression of the general whole. But in my view, this is only half of the story. Unless an empirical phenomenon can be posited as the basis for this ultimate unity, then the hypostasized unity of the cosmos must be recognized as a judgment of the intellect.

In my view, both "same" and "different" are ultimately discernments made by subjective consciousnesses, and have only a rudimentary relationship to things in themselves. What basis there is for positing sameness appears, as far as I can tell, to boil down to symmetry (in the physics sense), but the degree to which this corresponds to any truly existing unity on the part of any object is a difficult question. My guess is "not very much", and I find myself in agreement with the Zen master Dogen, who said that the Buddha way is jumping free of the one and the many. Both unity and difference are mere imputations of consciousness, in my opinion.

I am not a monad, I am a nomad. I retain Deleuze's play on Leibnez here and I like it. I enjoy rhizomes and terrain more than genealogy or teleology.

"I suppose there is not escape from questions of epistemology when we deal with metaphysical claims..." - not if you're a monist.

Although I must say even Deleuze is still wrenching his philosophy from this paradigm. The difficulty lies in that our claims to knowledge have always supposed a claim to reality, which is claimed to be something different than knowledge. It is a wierd play really, these two things (metaphysics and epistemology) dancing through history tied together by an impassable distance. Perhaps this is why both of these strategies have lost circulation recently. Neither is looked to for much inspiration anymore. The logical postivism resulting from these claims was so ridiculed by Voltaire who could possibly take them seriously (unless it be from a dare and I love dares)? Everything now is about infinifte collapse of these structures onto themselves and the infiinte, explsosive expansion that results from such a collapse. There is just no traction in monism.

Of the three you mentioned, I enjoy Schopie the best.

Of the monadologies currently in circulation I enjoy Taosim the best (which is hardly "in circulation"). At least in Taosim there is no anthropomorphism that posits humanity as some culmination or integral part of the whole process , i.e. the whole point of us being here is to be better humans, advance civ, reach enlightenment etc. These are all projections. At least Taosim has the honesty to say that humans are no better than straw dogs. If we could somehow get comfortable with this idea then perhaps we won't be so miffed to find out our intellect and our reality have been constructed as seperate entities.

There's my take, so what are some of your notions about the implications of monism?